Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Shawn F. Reeves and Julie N. Reeves v. Thad B.
Steinfeldt : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
D. David Lambert; Philip E. Lowry; Howard, Lewis & Petersen; Attorney for Appellees.
William M. Jeffs; Jeffs & Jeffs, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Reeves v. Steinfeldt, No. 950132 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6487

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
IN THE UTAH COURT OF k&P

DO
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SHAWN F. REEVES and
JULIE N. REEVES,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No. 950132-CA

Oral Argument
Priority 15

vs.
THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant-Appellee.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah,
The Honorable Ray M. Harding

D. DAVID LAMBERT and
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
ATTORNEYS FOR Appellants

WILLIAM M. JEFFS
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 NORTH 100 EAST
PROVO, UT 84606
ATTORNEYS FOR Appellee

FEB 2 8 1996
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SHAWN F. REEVES and
JULIE N. REEVES,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No. 950132-CA

vs.

Oral Argument
Priority 15

THAD B. STEINFELDT dba
STEINFELDT CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant-Appellee.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah,
The Honorable Ray M. Harding

D. DAVID LAMBERT and
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
ATTORNEYS FOR Appellants

WILLIAM M. JEFFS
JEFFS & JEFFS
90 NORTH 100 EAST
PROVO, UT 84606
ATTORNEYS FOR Appellee

PETITION AND CERTIFICATION

Reeves petition for rehearing solely on the ground that the
Court failed to explicitly state an award of attorney fees on
appeal under Utah Code Annot. section 38-1-18. Counsel certifies,
by his signature below, that this petition is filed in good faith
and not for delay.

A copy of the Court's opinion is attached.

ARGUMENT

THE COURT FAILED TO AWARD THE REEVES ATTORNEY FEES, WHICH REEVES
HAD REQUESTED IN THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS.

On May 10, 1995, the Reeves filed a motion to dismiss with
this Court.
appellee's

The substance of that motion was that plaintiff(Steinfeldt)

appeal was untimely

filed.

In the

memorandum supporting the motion to dismiss Reeves specifically
requested attorney fees under U.C.A. section 38-1-18.
On May 30, 1995, this Court ruled that disposition of the
motion would be deferred for plenary consideration. The issues in
the motion were the same as those briefed by the parties, and were
the same issues on which the Court ultimately ruled.
The Court did not in its opinion expressly award the Reeves
attorney fees.

There is no question that under the statute award

of attorney fees on appeal is mandatory, not discretionary.

See

Richards v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah

Ct. App. 1993)(attorney fees on appeal were awarded); Govert Copier
Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(same).
Reeves have made an affirmative request for fees. They did so
in their motion, which was disposed of in the opinion.

The Reeves

request in this petition that the award of fees be expressly stated
in the Court's opinion.
DATED this /JK

day of February, 1996,

PHILLIP^,) LOWRY>-£br:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were hand-delivered to the following this :25z
day of
February, 1995.
q^
William M. Jeffs, Esq.
Jeffs & Jeffs
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT

84603

FiLEt
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
Shawn F. Reeves and Julie N.
Reeves,

OPINION
[For Official Publication)

Plaintiffs, Appellees,
and Cross-appellants,

Case No. 950132-CA

v.

F I L E D
(February 15, 1996)

Thad B. Steinfeldt dba
Steinfeldt Construction,
Defendant, Appellant, and
Cross-appellee.

Fourth District, Utah County
The Honorable Ray M. Harding
Attorneys:

William M. Jeffs, Provo, for Appellant
D. David Lambert and Phillip E. Lowry, Provo, for
Appellees

Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Billings.
BILLINGS, Judge:
This is an appeal from a judgment determining appellant/
cross-appellee Steinfeldt improperly filed a mechanics' lien
against property owned by appellees/cross-appellants the Reeves
and awarding the Reeves an offset from the amount they owed
Steinfeldt under their construction contract. As a threshold
matter, we must determine whether Steinfeldt's notice of appeal
was timely filed, and therefore, whether we have jurisdiction.
We conclude it was not and dismiss Steinfeldt's appeal for lack
of jurisdiction. We therefore only reach the merits of the
Reeves' cross-appeal, which we reverse in part and affirm in
part.
FACTS
The Reeves owned real property in Lindon, Utah, upon which
they constructed a home. Steinfeldt acted as their general

contractor. Steinfeldt failed to complete the work as promised,
and the Reeves were forced to hire others to complete
construction of the home. The Reeves had made all payments owing
Steinfeldt under their agreement through October 1993. On
November 5, 1993, Steinfeldt filed a mechanics' lien against the
property in the amount of $17,929. As a result of this
mechanics' lien, the Reeves were required to escrow 150% of the
lien amount to close their long-term financing. To meet this
additional escrow demand, the Reeves drew on their line of credit
with Security Pacific Professional Services (Security Pacific) in
the amount of $16,500, and borrowed the remainder of the required
escrow from a business owned by Mr. Reeves. On December 22,
1993, Steinfeldt filed an amended lien, reducing his claim to
$12,764.19. A portion of the escrowed funds were thereafter
released to the Reeves.
The Reeves filed suit against Steinfeldt, claiming
Steinfeldt wrongfully filed his mechanics' lien and requesting an
offset for the replacement labor necessitated by Steinfeldt's
failure to complete the construction and for the cost of
escrowing additional funds.
On October 17, 1994, after a bench trial, the trial court
issued a Memorandum Decision, concluding Steinfeldt had filed a
premature, excessive lien. The court therefore awarded the
Reeves offset damages for the cost of finishing construction, the
cost of escrowing monies for the lien, and attorney fees. The
trial court directed the Reeves' counsel to prepare an
appropriate order. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
On October 25, Steinfeldt filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with the trial court, requesting the court to reconsider its
October 17 ruling. The trial court did not rule on this motion
until after a final judgment had been signed and entered.
On October 27, the Reeves' counsel sent Steinfeldt a copy of
"Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment." On November 4, in compliance with Rule 4-504(2) of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration,1 the Reeves presented a
:

Rule 4-504(2) provides:
Copies of proposed findings, judgments,
and orders shall be served upon opposing
counsel before being presented to the court
for signature unless the court otherwise
orders. Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within
five days after service.
(continued...)
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copy of the Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Judgments to the
trial court. The signed findings and judgment were entered in
the court's docket on November 7.
Unaware that judgment had been entered, on November 8,
Steinfeldt sent the Reeves his objections to the proposed
findings and judgment.' On November 9, the Reeves sent
Steinfeldt notice of the judgment. Steinfeldt thereafter filed
an Ex Parte Motion for an Extension to File an Appeal, which the
trial court granted on December 2.
On December 8, the trial court issued a second Memorandum
Decision denying Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration and his
Objections to the Reeves' Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and
Judgment and directing the Reeves to prepare an appropriate
order. The trial court signed that order on January 3, 1995.
Steinfeldt filed a Notice of Appeal on December 27, 1994.
The Reeves filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on January 11, 1995.
ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction
On appeal, the Reeves contend that under Rule 4(b) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal
was untimely because it was filed before entry of the trial
court's order denying Steinfeldt's post-judgment motion objecting
to the proposed findings and conclusions. Conversely, Steinfeldt
claims that neither his motion nor his objections constituted
post-judgment motions under Rules 52 or 5 9 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and therefore his appeal was timely. Steinfeldt
also contends the Reeves' cross-appeal should be dismissed as
untimely as it was filed more than fourteen days after
Steinfeldt's own notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(d).
In pertinent part, Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure provides with our emphasis:
(a) Appeal from final judgment and
order. In a case in which an appeal is
1

(...continued)
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-504(2).
2

Pursuant to Rule 4-504, discussed supra. Steinfeldt's
objections, which were filed nine days after Steinfeldt's receipt
of the proposed findings and judgment, were not timely.
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permitted as a matter of right from the trial
court to the appellate court, the notice of
appeal . . . shall be filed with the clerk of
the trial court within 30 days after the date
of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. . . .
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If
a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is filed in the trial court by any
party . . . under Rule 52 (b) to amend or make
additional findings of fact, whether or not
an alteration of the judgment would be
required if the motion is granted; [ ] under
Rule 5 9 to alter or amend the judgment; or
[ ] under Rule 5 9 for a new trial, the time
for appeal for all parties shall run from the
entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion. .

. . A notice <?f Appeal filed before the
disposition of any of the above motions shall
have riQ effect, A new notice of appeal must
be filed within the prescribed time measured
from the entry of the order of the trial
court disposing of the motion as provided
above.

(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a
timely notice of appeal is filed by a party,
any other party may file a notice of appeal
within 14 days after the date on which the
first notice of appeal was filed, or within
the ime otherwise prescribed by paragraph
(a) of this rule, whichever period last
expires.
DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.. 828 P.2d 520
(Utah App. 1992) is extremely helpful in resolving this
jurisdictional question. In DeBry. as in this case, this court
was asked to determine whether a notice of appeal was timely
where post-judgment motions were filed and considered by the
court. Id. at 521-22. The facts of DeBry are strikingly similar
to those before us.
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted Fidelity's motion
for summary judgment, dismissing the DeBrys' complaint. The
court thereafter directed Fidelity to prepare and submit proposed
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findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in conformity
with the court's ruling. Fidelity hand-delivered to the DeBrys'
counsel a copy of the proposed findings and judgment on April 24.
On May 2, Fidelity submitted the proposed findings, conclusions,
and judgment to the trial court. The trial court signed and the
clerk entered the findings, conclusions, and judgment that same
day. On May 7, twelve days after their receipt of the proposed
findings and five days after entry of judgment, the DeBrys filed
a document entitled "Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." In that
document, the DeBrys objected to various findings and conclusions
and argued that specific additional findings and conclusions
should be made by the trial court. Thereafter, on May 22, the
DeBrys filed a notice of appeal "from the order granting summary
judgment . . . entered . . . on May 2, 1990." On November 16,
Fidelity mailed the DeBrys a copy of a proposed order denying the
DeBrys' objections and additions. The trial court signed the
order on December 11, stating "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Plaintiffs' motion pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to amend the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law be and is hereby denied." Id. Following entry of this
order, the DeBrys did not file a new notice of appeal.
On appeal, the DeBrys argued their objections and additions
to the proposed findings, conclusions, and judgment was not a
Rule 52 motion. Specifically, the DeBrys contended the document
did not constitute a "motion" per se, reasoning that it was an
objection and not a post-judgment motion. Id. Thus, the DeBrys
claimed that Rule 4(b) did not bar their notice of appeal and
that this court therefore had jurisdiction to hear their appeal.
In concluding that the DeBrys' notice of appeal was not timely
filed, this court stated: "In determining whether the [trial]
court properly characterized DeBrys' document, we look to the
document's substance rather than its caption." Id. We continued
that regardless of its caption, "a motion filed within ten days
of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the
court's findings and conclusions is properly treated as a postjudgment motion under either Rules 52(b) or 59(e)." Id. at 52223. This court concluded that, in substance, the DeBrys' motion
requested the trial court to amend and make additional findings
of fact and conclusions of law, and thus was a Rule 52
post-judgment motion. Moreover, this court held that, because
the trial court can still alter or amend its judgment or findings
and conclusions under Rules 50, 52, and 59, "a notice of appeal
is of no effect if filed prior to the disposition of a postjudgment motion." l<j. at 523; flcggyd Bailey v. Sound Lab. Inc..
694 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); see also Swenson Assocs.
Architects v. Division of Facilities Constr.. 889 P.2d 415, 417
(Utah 1994) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction appeal filed
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after entry of signed minute entry but before entry of final
order).
In the instant case, the Reeves claim, and we agree, that
Steinfeldt's November 8 Objections to the Proposed Findings,
Conclusions, and Judgment is in substance a Rule 59 motion,
inasmuch as it asks the court to alter its findings and to amend
its conclusions and judgment.' In this motion, Steinfeldt
objects to the trial court's calculation of damages and the
naming of a prevailing party in the underlying action. He
asserts the trial court incorrectly determined the issues of
substantial completion and whether Steinfeldt's lien had been
wrongfully filed. Steinfeldt's motion does more than merely the
object to Reeves' proposed findings and judgment. It urges the
court to amend its findings and to alter its legal conclusions
and judgment. Thus, the time for filing a notice of appeal was
tolled until January 3, when the trial court denied this motion.4
We therefore must dismiss Steinfeldt's appeal because it was
filed before January 3, the date of the court's final order, and
because Steinfeldt failed to file a new notice of appeal after
that date.'
3

We need not reach the issue of the status of the October 27
motion filed post-memorandum decision, but pre-judgment. Even if
we were to conclude that this motion was something other than the
"functional equivalent" to a Rule 59 motion, this is of no help
to Steinfeldt. His subsequent motion tolled the time for the
filing of an appeal, see DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'1 Title Ins. Co..
828 P.2d 520, 522 (Utah 1992), and thus invalidated his premature
notice of appeal.
furthermore, Steinfeldt's motion to extend the time for
filing an appeal has no effect on this jurisdictional issue.
Steinfeldt filed and was granted an extension of time to appeal
the November 7 findings, conclusion, and judgment. Steinfeldt's
subsequent post-judgment motion made the November 7 judgment
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes.
5

In Workman v. Naale Construction. Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751
(Utah App. 1990), this court held that failure to give notice of
entry of judgment does not invalidate a judgment; rather it is a
factor for the court to consider in ruling on post-judgment
motions. In the instant case, Steinfeldt insists that his
failure to receive notice of entry of judgment in a timely manner
should likewise be considered a factor in determining the
substance of his post-judgment objections. He contends that because the Reeves did not mail Notice of Entry of Judgment until
five days after the trial judge had signed the Proposed Findings,
(continued...)
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The Reeves' cross-appeal is, however, timely as it was filed
in compliance with both subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requiring that notice of
appeal be filed within thirty days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.
As with post-judgment motions, we look to the substance of a
notice of appeal and not its caption. For this reason, because
Steinfeldt's notice of appeal is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, we view the Reeves' notice not as a Notice of
Cross-Appeal but as a Notice of Appeal. In so ruling, we note
that a party wishing to appeal is required to file a notice of
appeal with the trial court. Likewise, a party wishing to file a
cross-appeal also must file a notice with the trial court.
Moreover, there is no difference in the filing fee paid.
Further, if both parties had filed a notice of appeal, we would
merely designate the second notice as a notice of cross-appeal
5

(...continued)
Conclusions, and Judgment--one day after Steinfeldt filed his
objections with the trial court--this court cannot construe his
objections as a Rule 5 9 motion and should deem his notice of
appeal filed the date the order denying his motion was signed.
See Utah R. App. P. 4(c).
This argument overlooks important considerations regarding
constructive notice and Steinfeldt's own failure to adhere to
judicial rules. First, a party to a lawsuit is on constructive
notice of the contents of the court record and has a duty to be
aware of what the trial court does. In the instant case,
although he had not yet received notice of entry of judgment,
Steinfeldt was chargeable with such notice.
Moreover, under Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration, a party has five days after receipt of proposed
findings and judgments to file an objection. The Reeves mailed
Steinfeldt a copy of their proposed findings on October 27.
Allowing three days for mailing, Steinfeldt's objections would
have to have been received by the trial court by 5:00 p.m. on
November 4. Steinfeldt did not file his objections until four
days later, on November 8. It was incumbent upon Steinfeldt to
determine whether judgment had been signed and entered before
lodging his objections before the trial court. Thus, he cannot
complain on appeal that his failure to learn of the judgment or
to timely file his objections is the result of the Reeves'
failure to provide an adequate notice of judgment. Furthermore,
Steinfeldt received notice of the entry of the judgment and thus
was aware that his prior motion was, in fact, a post-judgment
motion. He therefore should have been aware that the time to
file an appeal was tolled until the court denied this postjudgment motion, and that he must file a second notice of appeal.
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for briefing purposes. See Utah R. App. P. 24(g). We therefore
determine wr.ather the Reeves' Notice of Appeal is timely under
Rule 4(a). As the Reeves' notice was filed eight days after the
trial court's order denying Steinfeldt's objections—well within
the thirty days set forth by rule--it is properly before this
court. See Utah R. App P. 4(a).
CROSS-APPEAL
In their cross-appeal, the Reeves argue the trial court
erred when it awarded them only $403 as the cost of escrowing
additional funds and failed to award them separate damages for
the delay in closing caused by Steinfeldt's wrongful conduct.
Whether the trial court erred in calculating the amount of
damages or in failing to award the Reeves separate damages for
the delay in closing, presents a question of fact which this
court will not overturn unless it is clearly erroneous. See Utah
R. Civ. P. 52 (a) .
In its Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact, the trial
court awarded the Reeves "$4 03 in interest for the monies they
were forced to escrow in this matter." * The Reeves assert the
proper damages supported by the record is $1,842.20, noting the
$403 figure reflects the cost of the delay in closing created by
Steinfeldt's premature lien.
The testimony of cross-appellant Mr. Reeves regarding these
damages was unchallenged at trial. In relevant part, Mr. Reeves
testified:
Q
[Reeves' counsel] And have you then
attempted to calculate the interest
differential between the amount that you had
financed on your construction loan at the
construction loan rate compared to the same
amount at the long-term financing rate for
those ten days that you were delayed in
closing?
A
Yes, we have. And the one
[construction loan rate] was a base plus two,
which would be six [percent] plus two was
eight [percent]. And our long-term [rate]
was four and an eighth [percent]. The eight
days of interest [due to the delay in
closing] came to approximately $403.
Q
With respect to the cost of having
to escrow the money at Security Title
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Company, have you attempted to calculate that
based on Exhibit No. 20 [copies of payment
records for the money borrowed to meet the
escrow demand]?
A
Yes, we have. This was a little
more confusing because it's a variable rate
signature loan, and every month the rate can
change. And it goes anywhere from
12.9 [percent] to 13.9 [percent] to
14.6 [percent] . Just taking an average and
estimating it, it came out to about
$1,842.20, the finance charge we paid.
Q
Now, that's just what you paid to
Security Pacific; correct?
A

Yes. . . .

Q
You also borrowed additional monies
besides what is reflected on Exhibit 20;
correct?
A

That's correct.

Q
Approximately another $10,000 from
your business?
A

Yeah. . . .

Q
But I'm just talking about the
amount that's -- the Security Pacific was for
16,500; correct?
A

That's correct.

Q
And so the interest that you've
stated is just on the amount that you
borrowed from a commercial lender?
A.
That's correct. I didn't charge
any interest from my business.
It is clear the trial court sought to award the Reeves
damages for the interest they were assessed on the $16,500
borrowed from Security Pacific. From a review of Mr. Reeves's
testimony and the trial court's subsequent memorandum decision
and judgment, it is apparent that the trial court simply used the
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wrong figure. Based upon the record, we conclude the trial court
erred when it awarded the Reeves only $4 03 as damages for the
cost of having to escrow additional monies. The undisputed
testimony at trial supports an award of $1,842.20 in set-off
damages for the cost of escrowing additional monies.
However, the trial court did not err by not awarding the
Reeves additional damages (in the amount of $403) for the eightday delay in closing. While the Reeves presented evidence at
trial regarding the costs of the eight-day delay, neither the
Reeves' complaint nor the Reeves1 counsel in his closing argument
specifically requested the trial court to award the Reeves
separate damages for this delay. Moreover, prior to initiating
this appeal, the Reeves never objected to the trial court's
failure to award such damages.0 Because this issue was not
properly preserved at trial, we decline to address it. West One
Bank v. Life Ins. Co. of Va . . 887 P.2d 880, 882 n.l (Utah App.
1994) .
CONCLUSION
We conclude Steinfeldt's notice of appeal was not timely
filed and therefore dismiss Steinfeldt's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. We hold, however, that the Reeves' notice of
appeal, was timely filed and therefore we address the merits of
that appeal. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred when it
awarded the Reeves only $4 03 as damages for the cost of escrowing
additional monies, concluding that from the uncontroverted
testimony at trial, the Reeves suffered damages in the amount of
$1,842.20. We therefore reverse and remand on the cross-appeal
for the entry of the correct amount of damages. Finally, we
decline to address the Reeves' claim that the trial court erred
when it failed to also award the Reeves damages for the delay in

6

This is especially troubling in this case as it was the
Reeves' counsel who prepared the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Judgment which the trial court signed. Thus, the Reeves
were clearly on notice of the substance of the trial courtfs
findings and judgment and therefore should have objected below in
order to give the trial court an opportunity to reassess its
ruling in light of the evidence before the court.
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closing created by Steinfeldt's conduct, as that issue was not
properly preserved at trial.

Judith M.Billings,Judge

WE CONCUR:
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